The paper addresses the question of pricing access to the network facilities of an incumbent firm after deregulation. Network access pricing continues to be regulated in such industries as telecommunications, railroads, electric power, and natural gas. We emphasize that access prices should be set such that they satisfy an individual rationality condition for the incumbent firm, so that access is granted voluntarily. We examine the effects of the voluntary access condition on incentives for entry and show that properly chosen access prices provide incentives for efficient entry using several alternative competition models: Bertrand-Nash, Cournot-Nash and Chamberlinian competition with differentiated products.
2 These has been some discussion of access pricing in regulatory proceedings. In 1995, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the House of Lords held in Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd. v. Clear Communications Ltd. that an incumbent local exchange carrier's use of the ECPR conforms with New Zealand antitrust principles concerning abuse of a dominant position. With the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Federal Communications Commission and every state public utility commission considered efficiency questions in evaluating the ECPR for the pricing of interconnection and unbundled access to network elements in local telephony. Similarly, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the state PUCs are examining whether the ECPR is appropriate for pricing the transmission of electric power. 3 delivered natural gas) in competition with the incumbent and transmit the service over the incumbent's network. Selling access entails opportunity costs for the incumbent because more efficient competitors displace sales of the incumbent's final service. We derive an access charge as the price that maximizes social benefits subject to the incumbent's individual rationality condition.
The expansion of output that occurs in the Bertrand-Nash case confirms Laffont and Tirole's (1994) observation that under certain conditions the initial price is irrelevant. If there is entry, entrants do not have market power, and products are perfect substitutes, the incumbent should supply only access if entrants are more efficient, or the incumbent should supply no access if it is more efficient than entrants. The initial price matters in general however. In the Cournot-Nash case, for example, the difference between the benchmark case and the equilibrium access charge is due to an adjustment for entry costs.
Our analysis extends research on the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR), also known as the imputation requirement, the principle of competitive equality, and the parity principle.
2 The ECPR, due to Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983) , and elaborated on by Baumol and Sidak (1994a,b) , specifies the access price as the sum of incremental costs and opportunity costs. Other proponents include Kahn and Taylor (1994) , MacAvoy (1996) , and Sidak and Spulber (1997) . In a later section we examine criticisms of ECPR pricing, see Tye (1994) , Ergas and Ralph (1994) , and Economides and White (1995) .
Our analysis differs from the existing literature because we consider a more general specification of market competition. Moreover, our model emphasizes efficiency of incentives for entry under voluntary exchange. In this regard, it differs from Tirole (1994, 1995) and Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1995) , who examine Ramsey-Boiteux pricing as a means of carrying out a second-best allocation of network fixed costs between the incumbent's final output price, the 4 access charge, and competitor final output price. The Ramsey-Boiteux prices depend on elasticities of demand for the final output as well as for the network input. Laffont and Tirole (1994) select optimal access charges that depart from the marginal cost of access due to the cost of public funds needed to cover fixed cost. The Laffont and Tirole analysis considers a more general asymmetric information model, while information issues are beyond the scope of this paper. Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers impose a standard break-even constraint and show that the second-best optimal access price involves a mark-up over the marginal cost of access only if the break-even constraint binds.
They conclude that if the incumbent's technology has increasing returns to scale, the access charge is set in excess of marginal cost, assuming uniform pricing and ruling out lump sum transfers.
Our model addresses three useful "quibbles" (their term) raised by Laffont and Tirole (1995) regarding access pricing. They suggest first that the contestable markets paradigm is of limited value in evaluating access pricing because it neglects the possibility of entrants having superior technology, or other factors that create benefits from competition. To address this issue, we allow entrant and incumbent technologies to differ and we examine entry in Bertrand, Cournot and Chamberlin settings. Second, they state that the ECPR is "only a partial rule as it does not specify how to determine the telephone operator's prices on the competitive segment." In our framework, the access pricing is not a "partial" rule because competition determines prices of the final service endogenously. Finally, they question whether it makes sense to propose a general access pricing rule without consideration of the market environment--for example, without considering product differentiation and cost differences. Our analysis confirms the need to adjust the access charge to account for the effects of product differentiation and cost differences on the market outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic framework. Section 3 examines access pricing with Bertrand-Nash competition. Section 4 considers access pricing with Cournot-Nash competition. Section 5 introduces competition with differentiated products. Section 6 compares our results with a benchmark case and examines criticisms of that benchmark case.
Section 7 presents our conclusions.
The Basic Framework
This section presents a model of deregulation with network access. An incumbent utility 5 provides a service that it delivers by means of a transmission or transportation network. Initially, the incumbent is the sole supplier of the service, which is sold as a bundle with transmission. After deregulation occurs, entrants obtain access to the incumbent's transmission network and supply the final service in competition with the incumbent. We do not consider competition between network providers, so that the incumbent remains the sole provider of transmission.
A. The Incumbent Firm
Let Q be the final service and assume that each unit of service requires exactly one unit of transmission, so that transmission is an input to the production of the service. The incumbent's unit cost of producing the service is c, and the unit cost of producing transmission is b. Thus, the incumbent's total costs are (c + b)Q.
The price of the final service is P and Q = D(P) is the market demand for the service. Let R(P) represent the incumbent's net revenue or quasirent from the service,
Assumption 1 Market demand, Q = D(P), is twice differentiable and decreasing with inverse demand
Revenue is a concave function of output, PO(Q)Q + 2PN(Q) < 0.
Before deregulation, the price of the service is P 0 and the incumbent's output is Q 0 = D(P 0 ), so that the incumbent's initial quasirent is R 0 = R(P 0 ). The framework is sufficiently general to allow the initial price to take any value between the short-run competitive price, P C = c + b and the monopoly price, defined by RN(P M ) = 0.
After deregulation, the market price for the final service equals P. The total output of entrants is X and the incumbent's residual demand is D(P) ! X. Thus, excluding the net returns from providing access, the incumbent earns quasirent R 1 = R 1 (P),
The incumbent firm's opportunity cost of supplying access equals the change in the incumbent's quasirent as a consequence of entry, ) = R 0 ! R 1 .
Letting A be the price of access, the incumbent's net earnings from the sale of X units of access equal (A ! b)X. Entry affects the incumbent's earnings both through the market price and the displacement of sales. The incumbent will not accept a competitor's offer to purchase access unless the net access revenue equals or exceeds the opportunity cost of supplying access to the network.
Assumption 2. The incumbent access supply decision is voluntary.
Thus, for the incumbent to supply access, individual rationality requires that the access price satisfies the voluntary access condition.
The voluntary access condition can constrain the welfare-maximizing access price. If the opportunity cost of providing access is positive due to falling quasirents, the access price must exceed the unit cost of supplying access. In equilibrium, the incumbent firm's opportunity cost )
depends on A through the market price and displacement effect.
B. Entrants
Entrants supply the final service by relying on access to the incumbent's network for transmission of the service to final customers. Entrants incur a cost of producing the final service equal to g, which differs from the incumbent's cost c due to differences in technology, input costs, or regulations faced by the two types of firms.
If the post-entry equilibrium is well defined, the post entry price and the sales of the incumbent and entrant will depend on the access charge, that is, P(A) and X(A). In what follows, the post-entry equilibrium will be defined for Bertrand, Cournot and Chamberlinean competition.
Entrants earn post entry profits equal to 3 Deregulation may require the incumbent to supply access to entrants on the same terms as it does to itself, see for example, section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 4 In the market for interstate natural gas, the major interstate pipelines became transporters of natural gas almost exclusively after the spot and contracts markets for gas displaced their merchant services, see Doane and Spulber (1994) . The interstate pipelines have continued to provide some merchant services through marketing affiliates. The case of full displacement is also consistent with the case of partial deregulation, with the incumbent being displaced only from the deregulated or "noncore" portion of the market while it continues to serve regulated or "core" customers. The incumbent's subsidiary has the same operating cost as entrants, presumably because the incumbent avoids costly regulatory constraints and can employ the same technology as entrants.
We examine the consequences for access pricing of efficiency gains from entry. Entrants can provide the service at lower cost than the incumbent, g < c.
Regulators do not permit the price to rise above its initial level P 0 , although entry can occur at the initial price by displacing the sales of the incumbent. Regulators further require that the incumbent supply the service through an independent subsidiary that pays the same access charge as entrants do for using the network.
3 The incumbent's deregulated affiliate can be one of the competitive entrants without affecting the analysis. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that if the equilibrium price is less than or equal to the regulated price, entry occurs and entrants fully displace the incumbent's sales. 4 If the equilibrium price exceeds the regulated price, then the market price is the regulated price P 0 . If entry occurs at that price, entrants displace the incumbent firm's sales at the regulated price. If entry does not occur, the incumbent continues to supply the initial output, Q 0 , that is demanded at the regulated price.
C. Regulation of the Access Charge
The sequence of events is a follows. Prior to deregulation, the incumbent sells the service at price P 0 . Then, the regulator chooses the access charge A. Entry takes place and the market price is P. When products are homogeneous, social benefits after entry equal 8
The policy maker's problem is to select an access price that maximizes social benefits subject to the incumbent's voluntary access condition (3). The policy maker's problem is therefore
In what follows, we will characterize the solution to the policy-maker's problem for both homogeneous and differentiated products. We contrast the unconstrained welfare maximum with the constrained problem, and show that the voluntary access constraint is binding.
In addition to determining the welfare-maximizing network access charge, we examine the welfare effects on entry at the constrained-optimal access charge. The social welfare effect of entry equals the change in consumer and producer surplus. Because regulation caps the price at the initial price level P 0 , the post-entry price must be less than or equal to the initial price. Initial welfare is 
Bertrand-Nash Competition
The Bertrand-Nash case has not been examined before in the literature. The contestable markets case that has been the standard approach has generally assumed that prices remain at the 9 (10) preexisting regulated price (see the discussion of the benchmark case in Section 6). In contrast, in the model considered here, the price falls to the entrant's unit cost. We assume that there are multiple entrants who engage in Bertrand-Nash price competition with the incumbent. Entrants thus are able to displace fully the incumbent's sales of the service when their operating cost g plus the network access charge is less than the incumbent's unit cost, c + b. Price competition then reduces the final output price to the unit cost for an entrant, The proof is given in the appendix.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that the inverse demand P(Q) crosses the average net revenue R 0 /Q from above. We apply this result to establish the following.
Proposition 2: If the market equilibrium is Bertrand-Nash with entry and the access charge maximizes welfare subject to the voluntary access condition, the following hold. (i) Entry occurs if and only if the entrant's operating costs are lower than those of the incumbent, g < c.
(ii) The welfare effects of entry are strictly greater than zero,
To establish Proposition 2, note that P B < P 0 if and only if
Since demand cuts the average revenue curve from above, the same inequality holds if and only if the entrants unit cost is less than the incumbent's unit cost, g < c. Thus, if entry occurs the price falls.
The welfare gain equals G because the voluntary access condition is strictly binding. Thus, the welfare gain is positive.
Proposition 2 shows that the access price satisfies the efficient entry condition and entry enhances social welfare because the market price of the service falls. The proposition is illustrated in Figure 1 .
<Insert Figure 1> From equations (9) and (10), the access price equals the margin of the entrant,
Notice that the entrant's cost rather than the incumbent's cost is subtracted from the equilibrium price. This contrasts with the benchmark case in the literature that we examine later on.
Alternatively, the efficient access price can be represented as a weighted average of the cost of access and the regulated margin, Under Bertrand-Nash price competition with entry, the decline in the market price is due to the lower cost of more efficient entrants and to the additional scale economies achieved through higher sales. The expansion of demand allows the recovery of the incumbent's opportunity costs to be spread over more units of output.
Proposition 3. In the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the access price A B and the market price P B are increasing in the entrant's cost g.
Therefore, the more efficient are the entrants, that is, the lower g, the lower will be the equilibrium price, and the greater will be output and the corresponding demand for access. This allows the access price to be lower while still satisfying the voluntary access condition. To show this result, differentiate eq. (11) 
Cournot-Nash Competition
This section examines network access pricing when entrants must make capacity 5 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that with a particular rationing rule, the Nash equilibrium of a two-stage capacity investment duopoly, with price competition in the second stage, yields the Cournot-Nash outcome. They apply the efficient rationing rule, which specifies that a firm's residual demand equals market demand net of the other firm's capacity. In contrast, Davidson and Denekere (1986) show that the Cournot-Nash outcome fails to occur with different rationing rules.
(14)
commitments at cost g per unit of output and entrants incur set-up costs f. The post-entry market equilibrium is modelled as a Cournot-Nash game representing capacity competition.
5
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the capacity game between entrants has the standard representation. An entering firm maximizes profit by choosing output q given the equilibrium output of the other firms Q ! , where profit is defined by
The equilibrium Cournot-Nash output per firm, q C , solves the first-order condition.
The following assumption is used to define the equilibrium access charge. This condition is sufficient for the firm's second order condition to be satisfied because POX/n + 2PN < !R 0 /X 2 < 0.
Let X C represent industry output and let n C be the number of firms including the incumbent's subsidiary. Then, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with entry (X C , n C ) is defined by the first order condition for firm profit maximization and the entry condition.
The equilibrium values (X C , n C ) are uniquely determined by the access price A. A higher access charge reduces industry output, Otherwise, if eq. (21) does not hold, the optimal access charge equals A* $ A C .
The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that the welfare-maximizing access charge can be greater than or less than the unit cost of access. It exactly equals the unit cost of access for linear demand. Condition 
The equilibrium depends on initial quasirent R 0 and the cost parameters g, b, and f.
The welfare effects of entry are now examined for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
The proof is given in the appendix. The demonstration that P C < P 0 and X C > Q 0 is illustrated in Figure 2 .
<Insert Figure 2> The access pricing rule is said to be efficient because it permits cost-saving entry. Entry reduces costs if the cost savings on the regulated firm's output outweigh total entry costs, where n is the equilibrium number of entrants, including the incumbent's subsidiary. As in the Bertrand-Nash case, entry can change the industry output and price. The condition does not state that entry occurs for any pair of entry costs f and market structure n. Rather, the market structure must be an equilibrium that is consistent with entry costs and the access pricing rule. Thus, given the network access pricing rule, entry is efficient if the equilibrium number of firms can produce the incumbent's output at lower cost.
The more cost efficient are entrants, the lower will be the access charge and the CournotNash equilibrium price.
Proposition 6: In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the access price A C and the market price P C are increasing in the entrant's operating cost g and setup cost f. 
The access charge is less than the mark-up over marginal cost to account for entrants' operating profits, or equivalently, to account for entry costs. Therefore, given capacity competition and entry costs, the network access charge should reflect the cost of entry per unit of output.
Product Differentiation
In this section, we consider a market equilibrium with product differentiation. We apply the Perloff and Salop (1985) differentiated products model, which combines elements of the Hotelling Each entrant offers a different brand, i = 1,2,...n . Each of the L consumers has a preference vector that assigns relative values to each of the brands, 2 = (2 1 , 2 2 , ...). Given n brands from which to choose, the consumer purchases the brand that maximizes his surplus, 
Combine the price condition (34) and the zero-profit entry condition (35) to solve for the equilibrium price and market structure. The equilibrium number of firms does not depend on the access charge,
With competition, each consumer purchases the brand that yields the greatest surplus. At the single-price equilibrium, the expected value of the best buy for any consumer is the expected value of the maximum order statistic, which equals n/(n+1) for a sample of size n from the uniform distribution. Thus, total expected net consumers' surplus under competition is
Consider now the regulator's welfare function. Entrant profits are zero, so that producers' surplus equals access revenues, (A ! b)L. If consumers' surplus and producer surplus were weighted equally, social welfare would not be affected by the access charge because of the model's demand assumptions and the equal weighting of consumer and producer surplus. This is because the access charge terms cancel out when adding consumer and producer surplus, and substituting for P D .
To examine the effects of access charges on net benefits, suppose that the regulator places a greater weight on consumer surplus S(A), than on producer surplus. Letting 8 > 1/2, the weighted welfare function is (37)
Proposition 7. For all 8 > 1/2, maximizing welfare subject to the voluntary access constraint, the constraint is binding and the access charge equals 
positive,
The greater the number of competing brands, the higher the advantage of competition over a single brand available with universal service. Moreover, consumer surplus can increase even if prices rise as long as the price increase does not exceed the gains from variety. In other words, since
Entry raises consumer surplus by increasing variety even with less efficient entrants as long as the cost difference is not excessive. That is, substituting for (P
The right hand side of eq. (42) is negative if there are three firms or less; it is positive if there are four or more firms. So, a cost advantage over the incumbent is necessary with fewer than four firms.
If four or more firms can enter, the competitive equilibrium improves consumer surplus even with entrants that are less efficient than the incumbent. Thus, less cost-efficient entry can occur with differentiated products as long as entry costs are not too large. The upper bound on fixed cost such that n D = (L/f)1/2 $ 4 is f # L/16. In the basic framework, the incentives for efficient entry are not altered by the access pricing rule. Limiting the price to not exceed the initial price P 0 would rule out variety-enhancing entry by less efficient competitors. This suggests that with differentiated products, the desirable deregulation strategy is to remove all price controls on the final service, and to allow 21 access prices that satisfy the incumbent's individual rationality condition. This will allow competitive entry to determine the appropriate level of product differentiation.
Comparison with a Benchmark Case
In this section, we consider the benchmark case due to Baumol and Sidak (1994 a,b ) whose key feature is that the market price does not change after entry. The access charge in this case corresponds to what is generally understood as the efficient component pricing rule. Then, we review a criticism of ECPR due to Economides and White (1995) .
Prices remaining constant after deregulation can occur under several different scenarios.
First, there may be a regulatory price floor that freezes prices at their initial level, so that both incumbents and entrants must continue to charge the initial regulated price. Second, the incumbent may be a "dominant" firm with one or more price taking entrants acting as a competitive fringe.
Finally, the incumbent may face competition only from a single price-setting entrant that sets a limit price and captures some share of the market. In the latter case, the incumbent is constrained from reducing prices due either to regulatory constraints or to the need to maintain solvency in the presence of fixed costs k such that R 0 = k. Generally, with entry at existing prices, the entrant has some share of the market, X = 2D(P 0 ), 0 # 2 # 1, and the incumbent retains a share D(P 0 ) -X = (1 ! 2)D(P 0 ). Because the price does not change, the incumbent's opportunity cost is ) = (P 0 ! c ! b)X. The lowest access price that satisfies the incumbent's individual rationality constraint equals recovers the incremental cost plus the opportunity cost of the regulated firm is therefore (43)
The entrant's profit is thus
Thus , marginal cost, they argue that even inefficient entry is desirable because it lowers the incumbent's margin, thereby increasing consumer surplus. To allow inefficient entry, the access price must be lower than the minimum price that satisfies the incumbent's individual rationality constraint. They assume that entrants are inefficient, g > c, and that P 0 > g + b. In response to the threat of entry, the incumbent lowers the price to the unit costs of entrants, P = g + b. Again, the entrant captures some share of the market, X = 2D(P 0 ), 0 # 2 # 1.
In the Economides and White framework, access need not be voluntary. The regulator is not bound by the voluntary access condition, but instead is constrained only by the need to cover the operating cost of the network. Thus, the regulator sets the lowest possible price for access at the perunit operating cost for the network, A = b. Consumer welfare increases because the price falls from P 0 to g + b. Then, the welfare effect of entry is as follows,
23
Substitute for P = g + b, and integrate demand by parts, so that DN < 0 and g > c implies
The welfare gain with inefficient entry is positive only if the share parameter 2 is small or demand is highly elastic.
To understand their result observe that given zero profit for entrants, P = g + b, the welfare gain from entry equals Thus, for entry to increase welfare, it must be the case that the gain in consumer's surplus exceeds the incumbent's opportunity cost.
Consider the incumbent's voluntary access condition. If entry increases efficiency, g < c, the incumbent's opportunity cost is positive. If entry decreases efficiency, g > c, the incumbent makes a positive profit after entry. However, a fall in the incumbent's sales, [
. In this case, access at the unit price b is involuntary.
Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that voluntary exchange is consistent with efficiency in network access pricing. Network access charges are a means of recovering the network provider's 24 incremental cost and opportunity costs of service. The opportunity costs of service are due to the loss in net revenue from the displacement of the incumbent's sales, offset by the earnings that the incumbent can achieve from employing its previously regulated assets in the new competitive environment. Thus, several common criticisms of the efficient component-pricing rule are misplaced. First, the access price derived in our analysis permits the market price to fall and output to expand for the final product relative to the price and output that had obtained under regulation.
Second, that result holds under a variety of market structures and competitive strategies. With
Bertrand-Nash competition, Cournot-Nash competition, and monopolistic competition with product differentiation, the access charge that satisfies the incumbent's individual rationality condition rewards entry by more efficient rivals and produces lower prices for the final product. The equilibrium access for each of these competitive situations is less than or equal to the access price that would obtain in the stylized benchmark case in which the incumbent is permitted to receive the initial regulated markup over the incremental cost of the final service. The greater the output expansion under competition, the lower should be the equilibrium network access price. The extent of the output expansion depends on initial prices and technology, the elasticity of demand, and the cost efficiency of entrants.
Our analysis focused on access pricing in the absence of alternative networks. When competing transmission networks are available and access is a homogeneous commodity, the opportunity cost of selling access is the difference between the market price of transmission service and the incremental cost of service. Thus, the minimum access charge that satisfies the individual rationality constraint is simply the market price of access. How the market price of access is determined when multiple networks compete is certainly of interest. Further complications in pricing access can arise when competing networks interconnect, and originate and terminate transmission for each other. These questions suggest the need for additional study of access pricing when there is competition between networks. Q.E.D.
